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40 
Constitutionalizing Ethics 
 
By Bennett Gershman* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On November 7, 2017, as they are mandated to do every 
twenty years, New Yorkers will vote on the following question: 
“Shall there be a convention to revise the constitution and 
amend the same?”1  The last convention was held fifty years ago: 
a revised constitution was presented to the voters, and its 
recommendations were decisively rejected.2  The battle lines this 
year have hardened, and diverse interest groups have coalesced 
to support and oppose a convention.3  Whether the voters will 
recommend a convention, elect delegates to the convention the 
following year, and ultimately approve a new constitution the 
year after that, is anybody’s guess. 
New York’s present constitution—approved in 1938—is its 
sixth constitution.4  It’s a lengthy document containing some 
fifty thousand words, more than six times the length of the 
United States Constitution.  It contains twenty articles 
compared to the federal Constitution’s six.  It has been amended 
two hundred times.5 
 
* Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.  I would 
like to thank the Pace Law Review for organizing the symposium on the New 
York State Constitution and inviting me to participate. This article was 
adapted from the author’s remarks delivered on March 24, 2017 at The New 
York State Constitution, a symposium of PACE LAW REVIEW, held at Elisabeth 
Haub School of Law at Pace University. 
1. 2017 Proposed Constitutional Amendments, N.Y. STATE BD. OF 
ELECTIONS, https://www.elections.ny.gov/ProposedAmendments.html (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
2. See Brian M. Kolb, New York’s Last, Best Hope for Real Reform: The 
Case for Convening a State Constitutional Convention, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
601, 603 (2011).  
3. See Lisa W. Foderaro, A Constitutional Convention for New York? 
This May Be the Year, NY TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/201
7/07/05/nyregion/constitutional-convention-voting-new-york.html?mcubz=1. 
4. See Jerald A. Sharum, A Brief History of the Mechanisms of 
Constitutional Change in New York and the Future Prospects for the Adoption 
of the Initiative Power, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1055 (2007). 
5. See Kolb, supra note 2, at 603. 
1
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A constitution codifies the rules and values that shape a 
state’s identity.  It is in effect a blueprint or manual for the 
operation of government.  It enumerates the powers of 
government and the rights of individuals.  The conflict over 
whether to revise New York’s Constitution is understandable.  
Most observers agree that there are many defects in the 
constitution—critics have called it a “broken constitution”6—
which they claim has created a crisis in state government. 
Among the provisions that need to be amended, critics contend, 
are the structure of the judiciary, taxation and funding, the 
budgetary process, environmental conservation, administration 
of elections, campaign finance, legislative reapportionment, the 
relationship between the state and local governments, and many 
other issues.  By the same token, reasonable arguments have 
been advanced by groups seeking to preserve the status quo, 
such as labor unions, abortion rights groups, environmentalists, 
and gun advocates who seek risks in a wholesale revision of the 
constitution rather than through the familiar process of 
piecemeal amendment.  Oppositionists also point to the huge 
cost to taxpayers in the multi-year revision process.7 
Nevertheless, the relentless criticism of New York’s 
government by good government groups for its dysfunction, 
inefficiency, and “culture of corruption”8 may be the most potent 
impetus for energizing voters to seek constitutional change. 
The purpose of this essay is not to weigh in the wisdom or 
utility in revising New York’s Constitution.  However, in my 
opinion, one of the most compelling reasons to amend New 
York’s Constitution is the need to incorporate into the 
fundamental charter a meaningful code of ethics, including 
 
6. See PETER J. GALIE, CHRISTOPHER BOPST & GERALD BENJAMIN, NEW 
YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE PATH TO 
RENEWED GREATNESS (2016). 
7. See Matthew Hamilton, Report: Few Pros and Many Cons to New York’s 
Constitutional Conventions, TIMES UNION (June 23, 2016), 
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Report-Few-pros-many-cons-to-New-
York-s-8321655.php (noting that 1967 convention cost $47 million, or $336.5 
million at today’s cost, if adjusted for inflation). 
8. See NY Reform Coalition: Albany Ethics Reform is Inadequate, More 
Comprehensive Plan is Still Needed, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT 
N.Y.U. (March 31, 2015) [hereinafter NY Reform Coalition], 
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/albany-ethics-reform-
inadequate-more-comprehensive-plan-still-needed. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/4
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procedures for its enforcement, and sanctions for violations.  
New York over the past fifteen years has experienced more 
scandals, criminal prosecutions, and convictions of lawmakers 
and other government officials for corruption than any state in 
the nation.9  It is certainly arguable that the extent of New 
York’s corruption, and the widespread cynicism and distrust of 
the New York government, may be attributable to the state’s 
inability to enact meaningful and enforceable ethics laws.  The 
public perception appears to be that New York’s government is 
not working for them and that some officials subordinate the 
good of the state to their own personal gain.  It is this crisis in 
government ethics that to me offers one of the strongest 
arguments for amending the constitution to bring about 
meaningful ethics reforms. 
Indeed, as of this writing, and despite numerous so-called 
“sweeping ethics reforms,”10 the current state of New York ethics 
laws is a hodgepodge of marginal, technical, and mostly 
insignificant rules that appear to have had only a meager impact 
on regulating the conduct of public and political officials.  New 
York’s ethics rules are insufficiently rigorous, and enforcement 
is negligible.  Nevertheless, despite repeated calls for many 
years for meaningful ethics reform, there have been no 
significant changes to the core concerns of good government 
groups such as ending conflicts of interest, regulating lobbyists, 
requiring disclosure of outside income, reforming pay to play 
abuses, and limiting the vast amounts of unregulated money 
that flows into campaigns.11  Tweaking and tinkering with 
 
9. See infra notes 66-70, and accompanying text. 
10. See Karl J. Sleight & Joan P. Sullivan, Ethics and Lobbying Reform 
in State Government (Again), N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202534430223/Ethics-and-Lobbying-
Reform-in-State-Government-Again (describing how Public Integrity Reform 
Act “overhauled last sweeping reform”); Karl J. Sleight & John A. Mancuso, 
Ethics and the Constitution, 12 GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 1, 35 (2010) (“collateral 
damage of scandal washes over an ethics commission and the commission ends 
up being replaced with a new and improved commission.”).  
11. See Albany Ethics Reform is Inadequate, More Comprehensive Plan is 
Still Needed, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/albany-ethics-reform-
inadequate-more-comprehensive-plan-still-needed (describing “reactive 
improvements [that] put nothing more than a dent in the problem of public 
corruption and obfuscate the reason our state is experiencing a crime wave of 
corruption.”); Rachel Silberstein, Since State of the State, Cuomo Silent on 
3
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Potemkin-like ethics laws—laws that create a façade of serious 
ethics oversight—and officials engaging in false bravado to 
publicize these “sweeping ethics reform” bills only reinforces the 
public’s cynicism over New York’s broken ethics system. 
Ethics rules, as discussed below, can be adopted and 
enforced in several ways.  First, investigations can be launched 
into allegations of official and political misconduct and systemic 
issues involving fraud, waste, and mismanagement which can 
result in recommendations on ways to regulate certain types of 
unethical behavior and enhance public trust in government.12 
Second, legislation can be enacted to prevent certain types of 
unethical behavior by creating substantive rules of ethics, 
procedures for investigation and adjudication, and imposition of 
penalties for violations.13  Third,  criminal prosecutions can be 
launched when officials are found to have engaged in deviant 
behavior that is not only unethical, but also violates criminal 
laws.14  Finally, amendments to the state constitution can be 
enacted to address ethics reforms similar to the legislative 
approach by adopting substantive rules and procedures for 
investigation, adjudication, and punishment.15 
 
II. Investigating Ethics – Moreland Commissions 
 
An important catalyst for ethics reform in New York State 
has been the Moreland Act. Enacted in 1907 under the 
leadership of progressive Governor Charles Evans Hughes, later 
a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,  the Moreland Act has been 
employed by virtually every governor to investigate problems of 
waste, mismanagement, and corruption at all levels of state 
 
Ethics Reform, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar.  17, 2017), http://www.gothamgazette.
com/state/6814-since-state-of-the-state-cuomo-silent-on-ethics-reform 
(“[T]here have been various incremental ethics reform measures passed but 
they have proved insufficient in preventing corruption in state government.”); 
Michael Gormley, Albany Criticized for Lack of Ethics Reform as Session Ends, 
NEWSDAY (July 2, 2017), http://www.newsday.com/news/region-state/albany-
criticized-for-lack-of-ethics-reform-as-session-ends-1.13778749. 
12. See supra notes 15-36, and accompanying text. 
13. See supra notes 37-65, and accompanying text. 
14. See supra notes 66-72, and accompanying text. 
15. See supra notes 73-78, and accompanying text. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/4
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government and recommend reforms.16  The Act authorizes the 
governor under the state’s executive law17 to create a 
commission to investigate the conduct of departments and 
agencies and expose inefficiencies,  political self-dealing, and 
criminal behavior.  Seven commissions were established by 
reform Governor William Sulzer, elected in 1912, which exposed 
widespread corruption by his own Democratic Party and 
recommended electoral reforms.18  The state legislature 
retaliated against Sulzer, and ultimately uncovered evidence 
that he had violated state campaign finance laws, and 
impeached and removed him from office.19 
Dozens of Moreland Commissions were appointed 
thereafter by reform-minded governors.  Alfred E. Smith, elected 
governor in 1919, established fourteen Moreland Commissions 
and even appointed himself a commissioner twice.20  Smith’s 
commissions investigated the state police, private industry, and 
public works, which revealed widespread corruption, 
inefficiency, and mismanagement.21  Governor Smith is credited 
with creating child welfare, workmen’s compensation, labor 
laws, and other state reforms.22  Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
elected governor in 1928, authorized a Moreland Commission to 
investigate the state’s banking department and recommend 
changes in banking laws.23 
But of all the many Moreland Commissions impaneled by 
governors to investigate public and political mismanagement 
and corruption, two commissions stand out.  Corruption 
scandals in the mid-1980’s produced a public outcry over 
rampant political abuses in state and local government, and 
created the perception that illegal and unethical practices were 
rife throughout the state.  In 1987, Governor Mario Cuomo 
 
16. See Bruce W. Dearstyne, A Century of Moreland, TIMES UNION (Aug. 
30, 2014, 4:49 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/A-century-of-
Moreland-5724049.php; see also ERNEST HENRY BREUER, MORELAND ACT 
INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW YORK: 1907-1965 (1965). 
17. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 6, 63(8) (McKinney 2010). 
18. See Dearstyne, supra note 16. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See Dearstyne, supra note 16. 
5
GERSHMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17  9:58 PM 
2017 CONSTITUTIONALIZING ETHICS 45 
created a Moreland Commission on Government Integrity and 
directed it to investigate weaknesses in existing laws and 
procedures connected with campaign financing, judicial 
selection, conflicts of interest, solicitation of government 
business, and the use of public and political party positions for 
personal enrichment.24  The commission, chaired by John 
Feerick, Dean of Fordham University Law School, spent several 
years conducting public hearings and issued twenty reports, 
including seven reports on the state’s campaign financing 
system.25  The commission found that the current campaign 
finance laws were so outmoded and inadequate that they 
undermined public trust and integrity in government.26  One of 
the commission’s singular achievements was a blueprint to 
reform the campaign finance system.27 
The commission made recommendations on many other 
political and ethical issues, including closing loopholes in the 
New York Ethics in Government Act, abolishing judicial 
elections for full-time trial courts, reforming laws on how 
candidates get on the ballot in state primaries, examining 
defects in the state’s open meetings law, limiting the influence 
of political patronage, and strengthening the whistleblower law 
of the state.28 
Much more controversial than the 1987 Commission was 
Governor Andrew Cuomo’s use of the Moreland Act in 2013 to 
create a commission to investigate public corruption.29  The 
commission was unprecedented.  In partnership with the state 
attorney general, it possessed the most extensive investigative 
powers of any previous commission in the state’s history.  The 
commission had broad power to investigate any matter that 
 
24. See New York State Commission on Government Integrity, Restoring 
the Public Trust: A Blueprint for Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
173, 174 (1990). 
25. See John D. Feerick, Reflections on Chairing the New York State 
Commission on Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 160 (1990).  
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 160-61. 
29. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 106 (July 2, 2013); Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo 
Creates Special Commission to Investigate Corrupt Elected Officials, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/nyregion/cuomo-
names-panel-to-investigate-corrupt-elected-officials.html. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/4
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involved “public peace, safety, and justice.”30  Thus, if the 
commission’s investigation revealed violations within the 
attorney general’s jurisdiction, such as misuse of taxpayer 
money by pension padding, no-show jobs, abuse of legislative 
earmarks, and fraud at the secretive public authorities, the 
commission through its deputy attorney generals—ten of whom 
were sitting district attorneys —could empanel grand juries to 
prosecute these cases.31  Given its broad mandate and 
prosecutorial experience, it was believed that the commission 
would likely uncover criminal violations and prosecute them. 
However, the results from these two high-profile Moreland 
Commissions are disheartening.  The 1987 Moreland 
Commission’s final report lamented that the laws of New York 
fall woefully short in guarding against political abuses in an 
alarming number of areas and that New York has not 
demonstrated a real commitment to government ethics 
reforms.32  The report urged the leaders of the state to act before 
new scandals erupted and to ensure that government ethics 
attain a meaningful role in the conduct of all state officials. 
Virtually none of the commission’s recommendations were 
enacted into law.33 
The 2013 Moreland Commission suffered an even more 
dispiriting demise.  The high expectations for an aggressive 
investigation into public corruption, which included focusing not 
only on outright criminal behavior such as bribery and fraud, 
but also widespread unsavory but legitimate conduct such as 
exploiting loopholes to bundle huge campaign contributions or 
receive so-called “lulus,”34 or extra payments in lieu of expenses, 
were quickly dashed.  The commission was hampered by 
infighting, arguments, and accusations, its independence was 
 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See Feerick, supra note 25, at 161. 
33. Id. 
34. See Jon Campbell, Legal or Fraud? NY Senate Defends Payment 
Tactic, THE JOURNAL NEWS (May 15, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.lohud.com/
story/news/politics/politics-on-the-hudson/2017/05/15/legal-fraud-ny-senate-
defends-payment-tactic/101711118/ (describing how eight New York state 
senators were paid thousands of dollars in stipends for committee positions 
they did not actually hold, a tactic known as “lulus,” or payments in lieu of 
expenses).  
7
GERSHMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17  9:58 PM 
2017 CONSTITUTIONALIZING ETHICS 47 
compromised, and its investigations undermined by pressure 
from the governor’s office.35  The governor abruptly disbanded 
the commission halfway through what he initially announced 
would be an eighteen-month life.36 
 
III. Legislating Ethics 
 
Calls for ethics reform through legislation has been a 
constant theme in newspaper editorials and platforms of 
governors, legislative leaders, and others for the past seventy-
five years, especially in response to the public’s reaction to 
repeated corruption scandals and other ethical misconduct.37  
Dozens of bills have been introduced in Albany to address a 
cornucopia of ethics abuses, mostly involving conflicts of 
interest, campaign finance, disclosure, pay to play, lobbying 
abuses, and gifts.  In 1954, after widespread allegations of 
unethical conduct by public and political officials in the harness 
racing industry, and in response to conclusions of the Special 
Legislative Committee on Integrity and Ethical Standards in 
Government, New York enacted the first generally applicable 
state ethics law in the country.38  At the time, the legislation was 
considered a pioneering effort to address abuses by government 
 
35. See Susanne Craig, William K. Rashbaum & Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo’s 
Office Hobbled Ethics Inquiries by Moreland Commission, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/governor-
andrew-cuomo-and-the-short-life-of-the-moreland-commission.html; Bennett 
L. Gershman, Is Gov. Cuomo’s Anti-Corruption Commission Going Off 
the Rails?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2013, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-gershman/is-gov-cuomos-
anticorrupt_b_4262062.html. 
36. See Jesse McKinley & Thomas Kaplan, Capitol Corruption Panel’s 
Demise Angers Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.c
om/2014/04/01/nyregion/cuomos-push-to-end-moreland-commission-draws-
backlash.html. 
37. See COMM. ON ST. AFFAIRS & COMM. ON GOV’T ETHICS, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, 
REFORMING NEW YORK’S ETHICS LAWS THE RIGHT WAY 7-8 (2010) [hereinafter 
REFORMING NEW YORK’S ETHICS] (“It is little wonder that the New York Times 
editorial page described our state capital as ‘a swamp of intrigue and 
corruption’ and 2009 as ‘New York’s moment of shame.’”); see also Editorial, 
Fed Up With Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/200
9/10/19/opinion/19mon1.html. 
38. See Forti v. N.Y. State Ethics Comm’n, 554 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1990). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/4
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officials of their public office for private financial gain.39  The 
problem of ethical standards, according to the committee’s 
resolution, “involves a whole range of border-line behavior, 
questions of propriety, and the question of conflicts of interest.”40  
It concluded that “the people are entitled to expect from their 
public servants a set of standards above the morals of the 
marketplace.”41 
Some revisions were made to the 1954 ethics law in 
subsequent years, but the law was largely ineffective in curbing 
conflicts of interest and influence peddling in Albany.42  Indeed, 
following new allegations of conflict of interest abuses ten years 
later, the legislature created another special committee which 
proposed a new Code of Ethics for legislators.43  The code was 
never adopted.  Thereafter, as noted above, following a series of 
corruption scandals in the mid-1980’s, Governor Mario Cuomo 
appointed another commission on government integrity, which 
led to the passage of the 1987 Ethics in Government Act.44  The 
Act imposed enhanced restrictions on conflicts of interest by 
lawmakers, particularly in their ability to represent clients 
before government agencies.45  The Act also established new 
financial disclosure requirements for state officials, created the 
State Ethics Commission, which had jurisdiction over the 
executive branch, and created the Legislative Ethics Committee, 
which had jurisdiction over the legislative branch.46  The 1987 
Act also created a Temporary Commission on Local Government 
Ethics which recommended significant reforms, none of which 
were adopted. 
 
 
39. Id.  See Patrick J. Dellay, Curbing Influence Peddling in Albany: The 
1987 Ethics in Government Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1051 (1988). 
40. See Karl J. Sleight & John A. Mancuso, Ethics and the Constitution, 
12 N.Y. ST. B.J. 1, 35 (2010). 
41. See Patricia Salkin, New York is at the Tipping Point in 
Public Confidence in Government, TIMES UNION (June 2, 2009, 10:48 AM), 
http://blog.timesunion.com/salkin/ny-is-at-the-tipping-point-in-public-
confidence-in-government/35/. 
42. See Forti, 554 N.E.2d at 876; Dellay, supra note 39. 
43. Id. 
44. See Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, § 73, 1987 N.Y. Sess. Laws 
(McKinney). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
9
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In 2007, after twenty years without any comprehensive 
change in the state’s ethics laws, the legislature enacted the 
Public Employee Ethics Reform Act (“PEERA,”)47 which 
purported to be a comprehensive modification of lobbying and 
ethics laws.  Although enacted without public discussion or 
debate, the Act was hailed by Governor Elliot Spitzer as a 
“dramatic, significant, fundamental step forward,”48 and by the 
New York State Assembly as containing “ground breaking and 
sweeping reforms to ensure the highest possible standards by 
government officials.”49  The lengthy Act, comprising forty-six 
sections, addressed many aspects of government ethics.  But 
despite the hyperbole, the Act was mostly cosmetic.  The Act did 
include a ban on honoraria, a reduction in the allowable value of 
gifts, prohibitions on nepotism, a ban on lawmakers appearing 
in taxpayer-funded advertisements, and increased penalties for 
violations.  But critical reforms were absent.  The Act did not 
address core concerns such as campaign finance abuses, conflicts 
of interest, outside income, financial disclosure, regulation of 
lobbyists, and lack of an independent ethics regulatory agency, 
including an independent bipartisan ethics commission with 
jurisdiction over all public officials, inclusive of both the 
executive and legislative branches. PEERA has been called a 
“complete failure.”50  Since its creation, numerous lawmakers 
were convicted of bribery, fraud, and other crimes but the 
Legislative Ethics Committee issued not a single finding against 
a sitting lawmaker. 
Three years later, in response to more scandals, Governor 
Paterson announced: “sweeping reforms to fundamentally 
change the culture of Albany.”51  His proposal included 
regulations to reduce campaign contributions, require disclosure 
of outside income, strip the pension from any public official 
 
47. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW, §§ 73, 73A, 74 (McKinney 2008); N.Y. CIV. 
SERV. LAW § 107 (McKinney 2011).  
48. See REFORMING NEW YORK’S ETHICS, supra note 37, at 7-8. 
49. Id. 
50. See LAWRENCE NORDEN, KELLY WILLIAMS & JOHN TRAVIS, BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U., MEANINGFUL ETHICS REFORM FOR THE “NEW” 
ALBANY (2011). 
51. See Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Seeks Overhaul to Combat 
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/ny
region/05ethics.html. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/4
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convicted of a felony, phase in public financing of campaigns, and 
impose term limits on all state officeholders.  In response, the 
legislature enacted a “comprehensive” ethics reform bill 
requiring greater disclosure of outside income for legislators, 
greater oversight of lobbyists, and replacing the existing 
Commission on Public Integrity with the Ethics Commission, as 
well as creating an Ethics Designating Commission to recruit 
and attract qualified individuals to serve on the commission.52  
The new commission would have jurisdiction over both the 
executive and legislative branches and would take over 
enforcement of campaign finance laws.53  Although the bill was 
termed the “strongest ethics reform bill in a generation,”54 the 
governor vetoed the bill, claiming it “falls short” of his call for 
independent oversight of the legislature.55 
The following year, the legislature enacted another 
“sweeping reform,” this time through the Public Integrity 
Reform Act of 2011 (“PIRA”).56  The new reforms were hailed as 
“dramatic and wide-ranging.”57  They included a unitary 
independent ethics agency with jurisdiction over both the 
executive and legislative branches, new disclosure 
requirements, and robust mandatory training for public officials 
and lobbyists.58  A centerpiece of the new legislation was the 
creation of the Joint Commission on Public Ethics (“JCOPE”) 
with the power to investigate both the executive and legislative 
branches.59  It was the sixth ethics regulatory agency to exist in 
state government over the preceding five years.  According to 
some experts, JCOPE represented a “sea change” in the 
 
52. Senate Passes Strongest Ethics Reform in a Generation, 
N.Y. ST. SENATE (Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/senate-passes-strongest-ethics-reform-generation. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See Kenneth Lovett, Paterson Vetoes Ethics Reform Bill He Calls 
“Deeply Flawed,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Feb. 2, 2010, 11:44 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/gov-paterson-vetoes-ethics-reform-bill-
calls-deeply-flawed-article-1.193984. 
56. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.19, § 938.1 (2011).  
57. See Sleight, supra note 10 (describing the new law as “representing a 
sea change in the enforcement and regulation of lobbying and ethics ion the 
state of New York.”). 
58. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.19, § 938.1 (2011). 
59. Id. 
11
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enforcement of state ethics laws.60  According to other observers, 
it was a “joke,” and amounted to “little more than putting 
lipstick on a pig.”61  Moreover, JCOPE’s so-called independence 
was disputed; its members are not “independent” but are 
appointed by the governor and the legislature.  Indeed, JCOPE 
played no role with respect to the dozens of lawmakers who were 
accused and convicted of corruption since 2011—it did play a role 
in removing one lawmaker—Assemblyman Vito Lopez.62 
Finally, in 2016, for the seventh year in a row, Governor 
Cuomo proposed an ethics reform package that included closing 
the loophole that allows limited liability corporations (“LLC’s”) 
to spend vast sums on elections, public campaign financing, a 
cap on lawmakers’ outside income, and expansion of the 
Freedom of Information law to cover legislators.63  The new 
Ethics Reform Act of 2016 did not include any of these proposals. 
It did include broader financial disclosure requirements that 
some critics have derided as over-excessive, but it did not 
address any of the above proposals.64  Although the 2017 
legislative session ended without addressing any comprehensive 
ethics reforms, one ethics measure did get passed.  It would 
remove pensions from state lawmakers convicted of corruption 
crimes.65 The bill will require an amendment to the state 
constitution, which will go to the voters in November. 
 
IV. Prosecuting Ethics 
 
Ethics violations and criminal conduct often overlap.  
Conflicts of interest and influence-peddling, particularly where 
 
60. See Sleight, supra note 10. 
61. See Editorial, New Teeth for New York’s Ethics Watchmouse, N.Y. POST 
(Nov. 8, 2015, 7:38 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/11/08/new-teeth-for-new-
yorks-ethics-watchmouse/. 
62. Id. 
63. See Nick Reisman, Cuomo: New Ethics Reform Bill is Just 
the Beginning, SPECTRUM NEWS (Aug. 26, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
http://spectrumlocalnews.com/nys/capital-region/politics/2016/08/25/cuomo-
ethics-bill-follow-new-york-state-albany. 
64. Id. 
65. New York State Legislators Pass Pension Reform Bill, DAILY 
MESSENGER (Jan. 30, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://www.mpnnow.com/news/2017013
0/new-york-state-legislators-pass-pension-reform-bill. 
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money is used by private interests to buy government favors and 
enrich the government official, can be prosecuted as bribery, 
extortion, fraud, conspiracy, and official misconduct.  Indeed, in 
the past fifteen years over forty New York State Legislators have 
been accused or convicted of corruption.66  The leaders of the 
New York State Assembly and Senate—Sheldon Silver and 
Dean Skelos—were convicted of federal corruption crimes for 
selling their influence.67  So was the former Senate Majority 
Leader Joseph Bruno.68  At least nine officials in the executive 
branch, including two persons close to the governor, were 
charged with bid-rigging and bribery in an upstate corruption 
scandal.69  Interestingly, none of these prosecutions were 
instituted by local or state prosecutors—they were initiated by 
federal prosecutors. New York State has the highest number of 
criminal prosecutions for corruption-related conduct by 
government officials of any state in the nation.70 
From a prosecutor’s standpoint, good government is about 
the rectitude of government officials in serving their 
 
66. Troubled NY Politicians: A List of Arrests, Scandals, Misdeeds, and 
Controversies, SYRACUSE.COM | THE POST-STANDARD (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2015/01/troubled_ny_politicians_a_li
st_of_arrests_scandals_misdeeds_and_controversies.html. 
67. Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v. United States, 
both convictions were later vacated.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2355 (2016). The government has announced it plans to retry both cases. See 
Benjamin Weiser, Dean Skelos’s 2015 Corruption Conviction is Overturned, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/nyregion/de
an-skelos-2015-corruption-conviction-overturned.html. 
68. See Nicholas Confessore & Danny Hakim, Bruno, Former State 
Leader, Guilty of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/nyregion/08bruno.html. 
69. See Vivian Yee, Ex-Advisers to Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo Are Indicted in 
Federal Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2
016/11/22/nyregion/ex-advisers-to-gov-andrew-m-cuomo-are-indicted-in-
federal-bribery-case.html. 
70. See Alan Greenblatt, Congratulations, New York, You’re #1 in 
Corruption, POLITICO (May 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2
015/05/how-new-york-became-most-corrupt-state-in-america-117652; Dan 
Clark, Yes, New York Has More Corrupt Officials Than Any Other State, 
POLITIFACT NEW YORK (Sept. 19, 2016, 1:38 PM), http://www.politifact.com/ne
w-york/statements/2016/sep/19/elaine-phillips/new-york-has-been-most-
corrupt-state-decades/; Kirstan Conley, Study Proves NY Politicians 
Most Corrupt in Nation, N.Y. POST (Nov. 9, 2015, 12:46 PM), 
http://nypost.com/2015/11/09/study-proves-ny-politicians-most-corrupt-in-
nation/. 
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constituents.  It is about the integrity of our democracy.  Using 
the criminal law to root out corruption is one of a prosecutor’s 
most critical functions.  As prosecutors see it, convicting corrupt 
public officials goes to the heart of the rule of law and the 
preservation of the democratic process.  Public corruption 
undermines the legitimacy of government and the confidence of 
the public that officials are not abusing their trust for personal 
gain.  Making those officials who abuse their trust criminally 
accountable for their misconduct deters other would-be 
wrongdoers, which is a paramount consideration by law 
enforcement.  Thus, as former United States Attorney Preet 
Bharara has stated, who was responsible for most of the 
prosecutions of corrupt New York lawmakers, “the cure to what 
ails our political system calls for hard-nosed investigations, 
fearless prosecutions, and savvy watchdogs.”71  Bharara noted 
that rule-makers with a self-interest in the status quo “do not 
often rush to change rules they themselves made.”72  The only 
viable means of ethics enforcement, therefore, may be through 
aggressive criminal prosecution. 
 
V. Constitutionalizing Ethics 
 
Amending the state constitution to incorporate new 
provisions dealing with the regulation of government ethics may 
be the most effective means of reform.73  Several states have 
“constitutionalized” their code of ethics,74 and while 
constitutional regulation of ethics is unusual and controversial, 
it may be one of the most effective checks on ethical misconduct 
by government officials.  Given New York’s failure to enact and 
enforce meaningful ethics reforms, it certainly can be much more 
effective than legislative regulation and enforcement.   
Moreover, a constitutional structure for ethics regulation would 
 
71. See Preet Bhahara, Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 601, 606 (2015). 
72. Id. at 607. 
73. See Symposium, Can a NYS Constitutional Convention Strengthen 
Government Ethics? ALB. LAW SCHOOL (Mar. 25, 2016); Karl J. Sleight & John 
A. Mancuso, Ethics and the Constitution, 12 N.Y. ST. B.J. 35 (2010). 
74. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. 3, §§ 7-8; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; HAW. CONST. 
art. XIV; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; OKL. CONST. art. 29; TEX. CONST. art. III, 
§§ 24-24a. 
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be a permanent fixture in state law.  It would avoid the cyclical 
gamesmanship that has characterized New York State’s history 
of ethics reform: government scandal, public outcry, “sweeping 
reforms” by the legislature, new scandals, public outcry, 
pronouncements that existing laws are insufficiently effective, 
and then more new “sweeping reforms.”75  Making ethics 
regulation a constitutional fixture would also dramatize not only 
the importance of ethics reform, but provide a framework for 
promulgating substantive ethics laws, procedures for 
investigation and adjudication, and the imposition of penalties 
for violations. 
Assuming that the voters decide to convene a constitutional 
convention and elect delegates to the convention to revise the 
constitution, there is good reason to believe that one significant 
area that would command interest and support would be ethics 
reform.  Given the ridicule heaped on New York State for its 
parade of scandals, described as a “culture of corruption,”76 and 
the resulting public cynicism over the failure of state 
government to reform itself, the inclusion in a new constitution 
of an ethics code and a regulatory commission for its 
enforcement would be a dramatic step towards meaningful 
ethics reform and ethics enforcement. 
The contours of a constitutionally-based ethics commission 
would need to be carefully delineated.  There would undoubtedly 
be legal challenges that would have to be resolved by the state’s 
highest court, the New York Court of Appeals.  One important 
challenge would be whether a constitutionally-created ethics 
commission should be empowered to draft its own substantive 
code of ethics, procedures for investigation and adjudication, and 
the imposition of penalties for violations.77  The drafting of 
substantive legal rules ordinarily is the work of the state 
legislature, not a commission.  There will very likely be 
challenges from both the executive and legislative branches 
about the commission’s power to “legislate” in the field of 
substantive ethics law, especially if the commission’s rules and 
procedures infringe too aggressively on the conduct of these 
 
75. See Sleight, supra note 40, at 37. 
76. See NY Reform Coalition, supra note 8.  
77. See Samuel D. Zurier, Pruning the Tree: The Supreme Court Clips the 
Power of the Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 48 R.I. B.J. 5 (2000). 
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officials.  Depending on the language used, it might be claimed 
that a constitutionally-created ethics commission has been 
granted the authority in the field of ethics to draft substantive 
rules of ethics and thereby accorded constitutional status equal 
to the status of the established three branches of government.78 
Another issue would be the composition of the 
constitutionally-created ethics commission. Who would have the 
power to select its members?  Would the governor or the 
legislature be authorized to make the selection?  Moreover, who 
would define the procedures for the commission’s investigations 
and prosecutions?  Who would be responsible for its budget? 
Presumably, all fiscal power in a state lies with the legislative 
branch.  If that is the case, then the legislature through its 
funding power could limit the power of the ethics commission 
through its control of the purse.  And too, who would be 
responsible for defining the penalties for violations, the 
commission or the legislature? 
These are only some of the questions that would need to be 
addressed if the voters decided to revise the constitution and if 
a regulatory ethics body was created in that revision. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Whether the voters decide to revise New York’s Constitution 
has been forcefully debated.  There are good reasons for and 
against revision.  But one of the most compelling reasons for 
revision is to adopt in a new constitution a strong ethics law. 
Despite numerous ethics investigations, ethics legislation, and 
criminal prosecutions of corruption, New York leads the nation 
in the number of convictions of lawmakers for corruption.  And 
despite the passage of numerous ethics laws and the creation of 
numerous ethics enforcement bodies, the state has not yet 
demonstrated a serious commitment to meaningful ethics 
reform.  It may be, as this essay suggests, that the only effective 
route to meaningful ethics reform is through a revised 
constitution that incorporates strong ethics laws and a viable 
 
78. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics 
Commission – Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 97 (R.I. 1999) (Rhode Island 
ethics commission exceeded its powers by promulgating regulations that 
impinge on executive or legislative branch functions). 
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mechanism for enforcement. 
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